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Over the last twenty years, the commercial development of the 
Internet has led to an age of unprecedented information sharing. The 
Web provides an incredibly immersive and interactive platform for 
knowledge sharing. Perfect copies of images, videos and sound 
recordings can easily be downloaded, reproduced and redistributed to 
millions of people around the world. For the first time in history, 
authors are empowered to share their creative genius directly with the 
world and doing so in a manner that is entirely consistent with the 
purpose of copyright—”to Promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.”1 
Not surprisingly, the rapid expansion of the Internet has 
outpaced the evolution of U.S. copyright law. The two principal legal 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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instruments governing copyrights—the U.S. Copyright Act and the 
Berne Convention—were drafted and enacted prior to widespread use 
of the Internet. The ease with which works are now published, 
downloaded, copied, and distributed would have been unimaginable 
to the drafters of today’s Copyright Act. 
The ability to publish works on the Internet has resulted in 
unintended consequences. In particular, the definition of “United 
States works” in § 101 of the Copyright Act is outdated in the Internet 
age. Specifically, when foreign works are “published” on the Internet 
they are “simultaneously” published in the United States. As a result a 
foreign work is a “United States work” according to the present 
definition. As a United States work, the work is subject to the 
registration requirement of § 411(a). Therefore, the copyright holder 
must register the work with the U.S. Copyright Office prior to filing a 
civil action for copyright infringement. As this Article will discuss, 
the U.S. registration requirement of § 411(a) is an impermissible 
formality which violates the Berne Convention. 
In restoring compliance, we must consider what works of foreign 
origin should be deemed “United States works” upon simultaneous 
Internet publication. This Article recommends that works of foreign 
origin should still be included in the definition of “United States 
works” when the copyright holder actively solicits customers in the 
United States via the Internet. All other simultaneous publications 
involving foreign works should be excluded. Implementation of this 
solution will eliminate the impermissible formality for the class 
protected by the Berne Convention while maintaining a level playing 
field with foreign competitors who avail themselves of the U.S. 
market. 
Part II of this Article provides background on the Berne 
Convention and its implementation in U.S. Copyright Law. Part III 
discusses the current statutory framework governing publication, 
followed by a detailed analysis of case law regarding distribution and 
publication on the Internet that spans from 1993 to 2011. Part IV 
identifies aspects of current law that are not in compliance with the 
Berne Convention and recommends solutions to restore compliance 
with the Convention. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Berne Convention 
The Berne Convention (the Convention),2 initially signed by ten 
countries in 1886,3 remains the principal international copyright 
treaty. Today, its membership spans 166 nations including the United 
States.4 The Convention was born out of the desire “to promote 
creativity by protecting the works of the mind” and to do so 
universally.5 To address this need, the Convention is designed to help 
nationals of its member States acquire international protection for 
their “right to control, and [to] receive payment for, the use of their 
[literary and artistic works].”6 
The Convention is administered by the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO)7 and was most recently amended by 
the Paris Act in 1971.8 
1. Territoriality & National Treatment Under the Berne 
Convention 
The concepts of territoriality and national treatment control the 
level of protection a work garners under the Convention. Article 5 
specifies that domestic law governs the protection of works, 
 
 2. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as 
amended Sept. 28, 1979, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention], available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/berne/pdf/trtdocs_wo001.pdf. 
 3. 1 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND 
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND ¶ 2.51, at 82 (2d ed. 2006). 
The initial signatory countries included Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Haiti, Italy, Liberia, 
Switzerland, the U.K., and Tunisia. Id. 
 4. See id. at 85 (“[T]he Convention has continued to be the centerpiece of the 
international copyright system . . . .”); Treaties Statistics: Berne Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works, WORLD INTELL. PROPERTY ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/statistics/StatsResults.jsp?treaty_id=15&lang=en (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2013) (providing number of contracting parties). The United States joined the Berne 
Convention effective March 1, 1989. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. 
L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) [hereinafter BCIA] (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 17 U.S.C. (2011)). 
 5. WIPO Treaties—General Information, WORLD INTELL. PROPERTY ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/general/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2013) [hereinafter WIPO 
Treaties]. 
 6. See id.; Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 1. The term “‘literary and artistic works’ 
shall include every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the 
mode or form of its expression . . . .” Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 2(1). 
 7. See WIPO Treaties, supra note 5. 
 8. See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 3, § 3.66, at 131. 
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regardless of the author’s nationality.9 In the country of origin, 
“[authors] shall enjoy . . . the same rights as national authors.”10 In a 
member state other than the country of origin, “[a]uthors shall 
enjoy . . . the rights which [that country’s] respective laws . . . grant to 
their nationals.”11 In other words, the basic protection scheme is one 
of anti-discrimination against authors from other countries. Failure of 
a member nation to provide such equal protection constitutes a 
violation of the Convention. 
2. Absence of Formalities under the Berne Convention 
The Convention prohibits formalities that interfere with the 
author’s rights. Article 5 of the Convention provides that “[t]he 
enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any 
formality.”12 In other words, when an author claims protection for her 
work in a member country, this protection cannot be subjected to any 
formality.13 The drafters of the Convention defined formalities as 
legal requirements imposed on authors in order to ensure that the 
rights of the author came into existence.14 More precisely, registration 
and deposit requirements were expressly identified as formalities 
prohibited under the Convention.15 
B. The United States Implementation of the Berne Convention 
The United States joined the Berne Convention on March 1, 
1989,16 more than one hundred years after the treaty was first 
established. Before that date, the United States was not eligible for 
 
 9. See Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(1), (3). 
 10. Id. art. 5(3). The country of origin depends on where the work is published: 
(1) If first published in a member country, that country is deemed the country of origin. See 
id. art. 5(4)(a). 
(2) If simultaneously published in several member countries, the country of origin is the 
country with the shortest term of protection. See id. 
(3) If simultaneously published in a nonmember country and a member country, the country 
of origin is the member country. See id. art. 5(4)(b). 
(4) If first published in a nonmember country, without simultaneous publication in a member 
country, the country of origin is the member country of which the author is a national. See id. 
art. 5(4)(c). 
 11. Id. art. 5(1). 
 12. Id. art. 5(2). 
 13. See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 3, § 6.92, at 312. 
 14. See id. § 6.102, at 323. 
 15. See id. (“[T]he word ‘formalities’ has been taken as synonymous with the term 
‘formal conditions,’ comprising, for example, registrations, deposit, etc. . . . .” (emphasis added) 
(quoting Dr. Meyer, a German delegate [find the source of the quote]) ). 
 16. BCIA, sec. 13(a),102 Stat. at 2861. 
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membership, in part because of the existence of the notice and 
registration requirements in U.S. copyright law17—formalities 
prohibited by the Convention.18 In 1989, Congress resolved the issue 
by eliminating the notice requirement for all works and excluding 
“Berne Convention works” from the registration requirement.19 
1. Notice and Registration before the Berne Convention 
Implementation Act 
From 1909 to 1989, authors were required to affix notice of 
copyright upon each published copy as a prerequisite for federal 
copyright protection.20 As a consequence, works published without 
notice automatically fell into the public domain.21 During the same 
period, copyright registration was required for “any work” as a 
prerequisite to filing an infringement action.22 Notably, by requiring 
registration for “any work,” registration was therefore required for 
foreign works. 
2. Notice & Registration after the Berne Convention 
Implementation Act 
Effective March 1, 1989, the Berne Convention Implementation 
Act of 1988 (BCIA) brought U.S. copyright law into compliance with 
the Convention, enabling the United States to become a member of 
the Union. 
Compliance with the Convention required the elimination of 
prohibited formalities. To meet this need, Congress eliminated the 
 
 17. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2576-77, 2583 (1976) 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. (2011)); Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 
35 Stat. 1075, 1077-78,  (1909) (repealed 1976).  
 18. See supra text accompanying note 15. 
 19. See BCIA, secs. 4(a), 5, 9, 102 Stat. at 2854-57, 2859. 
 20. See Copyright Act of 1976, § 401(a), (c), 90 Stat. at 2576-77 (“Whenever a work . . . 
is published[,] . . . a notice shall be affixed to the copies . . . to give reasonable notice of the 
claim of copyright.”); Copyright Act of 1909, sec. 9, 35 Stat. at 1077 (“[A]ny person . . . may 
secure copyright for his work by publication thereof with the notice of copyright . . . and such 
notice shall be affixed to each copy thereof published or offered for sale in the United 
States . . . .”). 
 21. R.W. Beck, Inc. v. E3 Consulting, LLC, 577 F.3d 1133, 1143 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting 
that material published before February 28, 1989, ordinarily was deemed to be dedicated to the 
public domain if it lacked a copyright notice). 
 22. See Copyright Act of 1976, § 411(a), 90 Stat. at 2583 (“[N]o action for infringement 
of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been 
made . . . .”); Copyright Act of 1909, sec. 12, 35 Stat. at 1078 (“No action or proceeding shall be 
maintained for infringement of copyright in any work until . . . the deposit of copies and 
registration of such work shall have been complied with.”). 
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notice requirement for all works.23 In addition, Congress excluded 
“Berne Convention works” (works of foreign origin) from the 
registration requirement.24 Eliminating the registration requirement 
only for Berne Convention works was an intentionally minimalistic 
approach to compliance.25 In doing so, Congress preserved the 
registration requirement for works originating in the United States. 
3. From “Berne Convention Works” to “United States 
Works” 
On October 28, 1998,26 Congress adopted the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Title I of which contained 
amendments to implement the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty.27 Like the Berne Convention, 
the new WIPO treaties required United States protection on a 
“formality-free basis.”28 As such, the exclusion of “Berne Convention 
works” from the registration requirement needed to be expanded to 
encompass works protected under the WIPO treaties. 
To accomplish this, Congress replaced the language excluding 
“Berne Convention works” from registration29 with affirmative 
language requiring registration only for “United States works.”30 The 
 
 23. See BCIA, sec. 7, 102 Stat. at 2857-58 (replacing the obligatory language in 17 
U.S.C. §§ 402, 403 (1988) of a notice of copyright “shall be placed” on all copies and publically 
distributed phonorecords with the optional language of “may be placed”) (emphasis added). 
 24. See id. sec. 9(b), at 2859 (replacing the term of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1988) “any work” 
with “[e]xcept for actions for infringement of copyright in Berne Convention works whose 
country of origin is not the United States”) (emphasis added). A work is a “Berne Convention 
work” if in the case of a published work: 
(1) one or more of the authors is a national of a nation adhering to the Convention on the 
date of first publication; 
(2) the work is first published in a nation adhering to the Convention;  
(3) simultaneously first published in a nation adhering to the Convention and in a foreign 
nation that does not adhere to the Convention. See id. sec. 4(a), at 2854. 
 25. See S. REP. NO. 100-17, at 54 (1988) (statement of John Uilkema, Chairman of the 
American Bar Association’s Section of Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law) (“We are 
satisfied that a minimalist legislative approach—i.e., doing only so much as is necessary to 
render the U.S. law compatible with Berne Convention—is appropriate. This is the approach 
taken by the House and the Senate . . . .”). 
 26. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (specifying effective date of 1998 amendments as of October 
28, 1998). 
 27. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
[hereinafter DMCA]. 
 28. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 15 (1998). 
 29. See BCIA, sec. 9(b), 102 Stat. at 2859 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1998) with the 
language “[e]xcept for actions for infringement of copyright in Berne Convention works whose 
country of origin is not the United States . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 30. See DMCA, Pub. L. 105-304, sec. 102, 112 Stat. at 2863, (amending 17 U.S.C. 
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registration requirement language of § 411(a) has remained 
unchanged since the enactment of the DMCA. 
III. REGISTRATION AND FOREIGN WORKS 
A. Statutory Framework 
1. Registration for Any “United States Work” 
Under the current statutory framework, a “United States work” 
must be registered prior to the filing of a civil action for copyright 
infringement.31 As discussed above, Congress intentionally amended 
§ 411(a) to exclude foreign works from this requirement.32 Doing so 
was necessary to gain membership in the Berne Convention and 
subsequent WIPO copyright treaties.33 Both treaties require domestic 
protection of foreign works on a formality-free basis.34 Currently, 
only authors of “United States works” are required to register prior to 
filing a copyright action. 
There is significant public policy benefit associated with 
registration. While drafting the Berne Convention Implementation 
Act, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary considered the option of 
eliminating § 411(a).35 However, the Senate maintained this 
requirement for United States works in order to preserve the 
following benefits: 
(1) Registration promotes efficient litigation practices.36 
Registration results in proof of ownership.37 
Therefore, copyright registration narrows the issues 
 
§ 411(a) by “striking ‘actions for infringement of copyright in Berne Convention works whose 
country of origin is not the United States[’]” and “inserting ‘United States’ after ‘no action for 
infringement of the copyright in any’’). 
 31. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2011) (“[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any 
United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim 
has been made . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 32. See supra Part II.B. Note that registration for all works is still required within three 
months of first publication to qualify for statutory damages or attorney’s fees in any copyright 
infringement action. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2011). This requirement is beyond the scope of this 
article. 
 33. See supra Part II.B.2-3. 
 34. See supra Part II.B.2-3. 
 35. See S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 36 (1988) (proposing replacing § 411(a) with 
“Registration is not a prerequisite to the institution of a civil action for infringement of 
copyright.”). 
 36. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 41 (1988). 
 37. See id. 
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that must be litigated in resolving the underlying 
dispute, to the benefit of the courts, the public, and the 
parties.38 
(2) Registration may deter frivolous law suits. The House 
Committee was also concerned that, in the absence of 
§ 411(a), the courtroom doors would be wide open to 
parties without a legitimate copyright claim.39 
“[P]laintiffs can exploit discovery and other 
procedures . . . to extract settlements and cause 
financial harm to legitimate competition and 
ultimately the public through higher prices.”40 
Therefore, § 411(a) to some extent may deter 
unwarranted infringement claims. 
(3) Registration helps to ensure a central, public record of 
copyright claims.41 Public access to this information 
promotes licensing markets by bringing copyright 
owners and licensees together. In turn, this serves to 
encourage further creativity by rewarding authors with 
incremental revenue that would otherwise not be 
possible. 
(4) Finally, registration is an important source of 
acquisitions for the Library of Congress.42 
2. Definition of “United States Work” 
In the case of published works, a work is deemed a “United 
States work” when any one of the following conditions occurs: 
(1) The work is first published in the United States. 
(2) The work is simultaneously published in the United 
States and another treaty party nation. 
(3) The work is simultaneously published in the United 
States and a foreign nation that is not a treaty party. 
(4) The work is first published in a foreign nation that is not 
a treaty party, and all of the authors are nationals of the 
 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. at 42. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2011) (specifying procedure of depositing of copies or 
phonorecords for the Library of Congress). 
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United States.43 
Section 101 is silent as to the meaning of simultaneous 
publication. However, the drafters of § 104A adopted a 30-day 
window during which all publications are considered simultaneous. 
Section 104A defines “[t]he term ‘restored work’ [as] an original 
work of authorship that . . . if published, was first published in an 
eligible country and not published in the United States during the 30-
day period following publication in such eligible country.”44 In other 
words, if a work was first published in an eligible country and was 
simultaneously published in the United States—within 30 days of first 
publication—the work is not a foreign work eligible for restoration. 
This is consistent with the definition of simultaneous publication in 
both the Berne Convention45 and the Universal Copyright Convention 
(UCC).46 As such, one reasonable approach is to apply the 30-day rule 
to the definition of a “United States work.” Under this definition, a 
work is simultaneously published in the United States and another 
treaty party when the time between first publication in the treaty party 
and subsequent publication in the United States is less than or equal to 
30 days. 
3. Exclusive Right of Distribution 
Section 106(3) grants the copyright owner the exclusive right to 
“distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending.”47 This right is limited to the first public distribution of an 
authorized copy or phonorecord.48 Any unauthorized public 
 
 43. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2011). “A ‘treaty party’ is a country or intergovernmental 
organization other than the United States that is a party to an international agreement.” Id. The 
term “international agreement” includes the Berne Convention, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and 
the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. Id. 
 44. Id. § 104A(h)(6)(D). 
 45. Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 3(4) (“A work shall be considered as having 
been published simultaneously in several countries if it has been published in two or more 
countries within thirty days of its first publication.”) (emphasis added). 
 46. The Universal Copyright Convention, art. 4(6), Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, 216 
U.N.T.S. 134, as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1349, 943 U.N.T.S. 178 
(“[A]ny work published in two or more . . . States within thirty days of its first publication shall 
be considered as having been published simultaneously in said . . . States.”) (emphasis added). 
The United States has been a member of the UCC since September 16, 1955. See International 
Copyright, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl100.html (last visited Apr. 
10, 2013). 
 47. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2011). 
 48. See id. § 109(a) (2011) (first sale doctrine); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62 (1976) (“As 
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distribution of copies or phonorecords that were unlawfully made 
could constitute infringement.49 
4. Definition of “Publication” 
Publication is affected by distribution. The Copyright Act 
defines publication in terms of both actual distributions and offers to 
distribute: 
Publication is [1] the [actual] distribution of copies or 
phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of 
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. [2] The offering to 
distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for 
purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public 
display, constitutes publication. [3] A public performance or 
display of a work does not of itself constitute publication.50 
Actual distribution occurs when one or more copies or 
phonorecords are distributed to the public.51 Central to the definition 
of actual distribution is that there must be a transfer of possession—
by sale, rental, lease, lending, or other transfer—of a material object52 
from the copyright holder to the public.53 The reader should note that 
an actual transfer of ownership is sufficient but not necessary for 
publication by actual distribution. 
Alternatively, certain offers-to-distribute the material object for 
further distribution constitute publication.54 Unlike publication by 
actual distribution, publication by an offer to distribute does not 
require a transfer of possession of a material object.55 Because of the 
 
section 109 makes clear, however, the copyright owner’s rights under section 106(3) cease with 
respect to a particular copy or phonorecord once he has parted with ownership of it.”). 
 49. See 17 U.S.C. § 501. 
 50. Id. § 101 (emphasis added). 
 51. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 138. The “public” means persons under no express or 
implied restrictions with respect to disclosure of the work.” Id. 
 52. “Copies” and “phonorecords” are defined as material objects in which a work is 
fixed, such as a book, periodical, manuscript, phonorecord, film, tape, or disks. See § 101. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See Id. (definition of publication). 
 55. See Id. The plain language makes clear that Congress did not intend for publication 
by an offer to distribute to require actual transfer of a possessory interest in the material object. 
Had Congress intended such a requirement, the drafters could easily have included the language 
“to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending” found in the 
preceding sentence but chose not to. The majority of courts agree. See Capitol Records Inc. v. 
Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1223 (D. Minn. 2008) (“The general rule, supported by the great 
weight of authority, is that ‘infringement of [the distribution right] requires an actual 
dissemination of either copies or phonorecords.” (alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Car 
Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 434 (8th Cir. 1993)) (internal 
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clear distinction between actual distributions and offers to distribute 
in the definition of “publication,” the exclusive right of distribution 
appears to be limited to actual distribution.56 In other words, there 
must be an unauthorized transfer of possession of a material object for 
there to be infringement.57 
B. Internet Publication 
1. How Material Objects Change Hands on the Internet 
As noted above, actual distribution requires, at a minimum, a 
transfer of possession of a material object.58 Books and music CDs 
are very common examples of material objects—a physical object in 
which a copy of the original work is fixed. But what constitutes a 
material object on the Internet? At what point does a possessory 
interest in such an object change hands from copyright owner to the 
public? 
In the electronic world, electronic data files—encoded magnetic 
particles on a portion of the physical hard disk—constitute material 
objects of the works they embody.59 The Internet is a communications 
network that connects users to a myriad of linked works including 
documents, images, music, and video content available on the Web.60 
 
quotation marks omitted)); London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 169 (D. 
Mass. 2008) (“If [the author] merely offers to sell [the copyrighted work] to . . . [a] member of 
the public, that is neither a distribution nor a publication. And if the author offers to sell the 
manuscript to a publishing house ‘for purposes of further distribution,’ but does not actually do 
so, that is a publication but not a distribution.”). 
 56. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). Congress reapplied the exact language of publication by 
actual distribution—to “distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public 
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending”—when defining the 
exclusive right of distribution. Id. 
 57. Note that a minority of courts disagree, holding that merely making a work available 
for unauthorized copying constitutes an offer to distribute in violation of the right of 
distribution. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Payne, No. W-06-CA-051, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 65765, at *10 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (“[L]isting copyrighted works on an online file-sharing 
system contemplates ‘further distribution,’ and thus, could constitute a violation of the copyright 
owner’s exclusive distribution right under § 106(3).”). 
 58. See supra text accompanying note 53. 
 59. London-Sire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 171 (“The electronic file (or, perhaps 
more accurately, the appropriate segment of the hard disk) is therefore a ‘phonorecord’ within 
the meaning of the statute.”). 
 60. Definition of Internet, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/internet (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (defining Internet as “an electronic 
communications network that connects computer networks and organizational computer 
facilities around the world”); Definition of World Wide Web, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/world+wide+web?show=0&t=1335114819 (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2013) (defining World Wide Web as “a part of the Internet accessed through a 
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Prior to any transfer of ownership or possession, each of these objects 
resides as an electronic data file stored on a hard disk. 
In London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, the court held that the 
term “material object” indeed includes electronic copies. This court 
reasoned that the term “material” “should not be understood as 
separating tangible copies from non-tangible copies. Rather, it 
separates a copy from the abstract original work . . . .”61 For example, 
sounds—the abstract original work—are separate from the 
phonorecord—the copy or material object—in which they are fixed.62 
Further, Congress defined material object as a tangible medium of 
expression in which an abstract original work is fixed.63 The only 
express limitation on this medium of expression is that it be 
“sufficiently permanent or stable to permit [the work] to be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than 
transitory duration.”64 Clearly, electronic files satisfy this limitation. 
Therefore, the copyright owner’s rights extend beyond tangible, 
physical objects to include purely electronic distributions of their 
work.65 Based on this reasoning, the court held that “an electronic file 
transfer can constitute a ‘transfer of ownership’ as that term is used in 
§ 106(3).”66 
Transfer of ownership or possession on the Internet occurs when 
a data file is downloaded from a web server to a local computer. Once 
the file transfer is complete, a copy of the data file resides on a hard 
disk in the possession of the person who requested the file.67 For 
example, music is commonly distributed on the Internet in the format 
of MP3 files.68 Once an MP3 file is posted to the Internet (by copying 
the file onto the hard disk of the server on which the data for the 
website resides), the file can be downloaded directly to a local 
computer.69 Upon completion of the download, the person receiving 
the MP3 file now has possession of the sound recording embodied in 
a material object (the person’s hard disk) and the ability to play the 
 
graphical user interface and containing documents often connected by hyperlinks—called also 
Web”). 
 61. London-Sire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 173. 
 62. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See London-Sire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 174. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See PRESTON GRALLA, HOW THE INTERNET WORKS 147 (8th ed. 2007). 
 68. See id. at 252. 
 69. See id. at 253. 
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music, make copies and further distribute the file.70 
2. What Constitutes Distribution and Publication on the 
Internet? 
From the earliest days of the Internet in 1993 to 2008 it is 
understandable that the courts were operating in a reactionary mode to 
the rapid onset of Internet technology. Therefore, it is not surprising 
to observe four distinct attempts at defining distribution on the 
Internet during this period. Specifically, copyright infringement 
occurred on the Internet when: 
(1) Distribution occurred where copies were made 
available for download.71 
(2) Distribution occurred where copies were sold to the 
public.72 
(3) Publication occurred where copies were made 
available causing a transfer of the possessory interest.73 
(4) Publication—in violation of the distribution right—
occurred where copies were offered for further 
distribution.74 
More recent decisions have adhered more closely to the statutory 
requirement. They held that publication requires an actual transfer of 
ownership or transfer in a possessory interest. 
a. Early Decisions: Distribution Occurred When 
Copies Were Made Available for Download 
Only two years after the launch of the Web,75 in 1993, the 
Middle District of Florida decided Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Frena.76 In Frena, the defendant operated an electronic “bulletin 
 
 70. See id. 
 71. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 
284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002); Advance Magazine Publishers Inc. v. Leach, 466 F. Supp. 2d. 
628, 632 (D. Md. 2006); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 513 
(N.D. Ohio 1997); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1039 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
 72. See N.Y. Times, Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 499 (2001). 
 73. See Getaped.com, Inc. v. Cangemi, 188 F. Supp. 2d 398, 401-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 74. See Atl. Recording Corp. v. Anderson, No. H-06-3578, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
53654, at *20 (S.D. Tex. 2008). 
 75. See GRALLA, supra note 67, at 11 (dating the development of the World Wide Web to 
1991). 
 76. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552. 
DOMBKOWSKI 5/20/2013  12:16 PM 
2013] SIMULTANEOUS INTERNET PUBLICATION 657 
board”77 on which paid subscribers were permitted to share and 
download files.78 Playboy sued Frena for copyright infringement after 
discovering 170 of its images were displayed and available for 
unauthorized download on the bulletin board.79 In finding an 
unauthorized distribution to the public, the court focused on the fact 
that Frena “supplied a [website] containing unauthorized copies of a 
copyrighted work.”80 The court disregarded the fact that Frena himself 
did not post the infringing images and it did not require evidence of 
actual downloading.81 This case stands for the proposition that 
making a file-sharing platform available on the Internet is sufficient to 
find liability for any infringing files posted to it by its visitors. 
While this holding appears far-reaching, the record shows that 
Frena’s subscribers not only browsed Playboy’s images but also 
downloaded them.82 More recent jurisprudence would likely have 
reached a similar conclusion but for different reasons. The act of 
downloading the infringing images constituted a “transfer of 
ownership” of the data representing the copyrighted work. As such, 
the transaction should have been deemed an unauthorized publication 
in violation of Playboy’s exclusive right to distribute these images. 
As the Internet spawned a new breed of high-tech infringers, 
Playboy continued to vigorously assert its intellectual property rights. 
In 1996, Playboy sued Chuckleberry Publishing for operating an 
Italian based website called PLAYMEN in violation of an 
injunction.83 The purpose of the injunction was to prohibit the 
defendant from distributing its product in the United States.84 The 
case turned on whether the defendant “distributed or sold the 
PLAYMEN magazine in the United States when it established an 
Internet site” in Italy displaying pictorial images under the 
 
 77. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 505 (N.D. 
Ohio 1997) (“A computer bulletin board service . . . offers home computer owners a method for 
obtaining information from a central source . . . .” ). In contrast, a peer-to-peer file sharing 
network offers a method for obtaining information from distributed computers throughout the 
peer network. See GRALLA supra note 67, at 392. 
 78. Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1554. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1556. 
 81. Id. at 1554 (the images were posted by subscribers to the bulletin board). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996). See also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981), aff’d, 687 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1982) (enjoining Chuckleberry Publishing from using the 
PLAYMEN mark in connection with a male sophisticate magazine in the United States on the 
basis of trademark infringement). 
 84. See Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. at 1037. 
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PLAYMEN name.85 In Chuckleberry, the court built upon the Frena 
decision, finding a distribution where defendant: (1) provided an 
Internet platform that (2) supplied content which (3) could be 
downloaded and stored upon subscribers’ computers.86 
Chuckleberry added a new dimension to the discussion, by 
asking whether such activity performed on a foreign Internet site 
constituted a distribution in the United States. The court looked to 
evidence that the defendant maintained online accounts with U.S. 
customers.87 Based on these facts, the court held that the “[d]efendant 
actively solicited United States customers . . . , and in doing so ha[d] 
distributed its product within the United States.”88 
The Chuckleberry holding is broader than Frena because there 
was no evidence of actual downloading. Chuckleberry therefore 
stands for the rule that merely making a work available for download 
on the Internet constitutes distribution.89 
In the ongoing battle to protect its business model, Playboy 
returned to the courthouse again in 1997. This time, Playboy brought 
suit against Russ Hardenburgh, Inc. for operating a bulletin board 
service on which Hardenburgh made available 412 of Playboy’s 
images for unauthorized download.90 Like Frena, Hardenburgh 
supplied a file-sharing platform from which unauthorized images 
could be downloaded. However, taking it one step further, 
Hardenburgh actively encouraged subscribers to upload adult 
photographs.91 Consistent with Frena, the Hardenburgh court held 
that a distribution occurred when unauthorized images were made 
available for download on a website. 
In 2001, the Ninth Circuit famously brought an end to Napster’s 
Internet-based music file-sharing system.92 Unlike the centralized 
 
 85. Id. at 1036. 
 86. See id. at 1039. 
 87. See id. (the defendant sent U.S. subscribers an email with user name and password). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Getaped.com, Inc. v. Cangemi, 188 F. Supp. 2d 398, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing 
Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. at 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (uploading content on internet 
and inviting users to download it violates exclusive publication right)). 
 90. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 505 (N.D. Ohio 
1997). 
 91. See id. at 506 (“Subscribers were given a ‘credit’ for each megabyte of electronic data 
that they uploaded onto the system. For each credit, the subscriber was entitled to download 1.5 
extra megabytes of electronic information, in addition to the megabytes available under the 
normal terms of subscription.”). 
 92. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 284 F.3d 
1091 (9th Cir. 2002); see also John Borland, Roxio Closes Napster Asset Buy, CNET NEWS 
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“bulletin board” file-sharing systems in the Playboy cases, Napster’s 
file sharing occurred across a distributed peer-to-peer network.93 In 
this scheme, each user volunteered their own computer to serve as one 
node in a vast network of Napster users.94 To connect this network, 
Napster provided software to its members.95 The software enabled its 
users to make their own MP3 files available for download to any 
other Napster user in the network.96 In exchange, the software allowed 
each user to search the network and download MP3s directly from the 
hard drives of other Napster users. 
Despite the differences between centralized and distributed peer-
to-peer file sharing, the basis for finding infringement was the same. 
In Napster, the court held that “Napster users who upload file names 
to the search index for others to copy violate . . . [the record 
company’s] distribution rights.”97 As in the file-sharing cases before 
it, the Napster court suggested that merely making files available for 
download—as opposed to requiring actual downloads—constituted a 
violation of the record company’s distribution right. 
In 2001, Advanced Magazine Publishers (AMP) brought an 
infringement action against David Leach for making unauthorized 
electronic copies of book-length stories available for download on the 
Internet.98 Leach (1) scanned the literary works into electronic form, 
(2) integrated the works with paid advertising, and (3) made the 
works available for download on the Internet.99 In its analysis, the 
court found that the defendant’s online database of literary works was 
similar to the Nexis online database in New York Times v. Tasini.100 
Consistent with Justice Ginsburg’s dicta in Tasini,101 the court held 
that “[d]efendant operates . . . an online database of literary works, 
and by making available unauthorized copies of Plaintiff’s 
publications, he . . . infringed [plaintiff’s] right to distribution.”102 In 
other words, the court concluded that creation of a capability to 
 
(Nov. 27, 2002, 4:30 PM), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-975627.html (discussing the demise 
of Napster). 
 93. See Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1012 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. at 1011. 
 96. See id. at 1011-12. 
 97. Id. at 1014. 
 98. See Advance Magazine Publishers Inc. v. Leach, 466 F. Supp. 2d. 628, 632 (D. Md. 
2006). 
 99. See id. 
 100. See N.Y. Times, Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
 101. See infra note 108. 
 102. Advance Magazine Publishers Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d. at 638. 
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transfer possession of copies of the articles, rather than the actual 
transfer, was an unauthorized distribution. 
b. Early Decisions: Distribution Occurred When 
Copies Were Sold to the Public 
In 2001, the Supreme Court weighed in on the discussion in New 
York Times v. Tasini.103 In Tasini, freelance writers sued Lexis Nexis 
for the unauthorized placement of their articles in the Nexis 
Database.104 In finding infringement, the court held that “by selling 
copies of the Articles through the NEXIS Database, [Lexis Nexis] 
‘distribute[d] copies’ of the Articles ‘to the public by sale’” in 
violation of the author’s exclusive distribution right.105 
Although in dicta, Justice Ginsburg commented that “[t]he 
crucial fact is that the [D]atabase[] . . . store[s] and retrieve[s] articles 
separately within a vast domain of diverse texts. Such a storage and 
retrieval system effectively overrides the Authors’ exclusive right to 
control the individual . . . distribution of each Article . . . .”106 It is 
striking how readily Ginsburg’s description of the Nexis database 
applies to the Internet. For example, Google enables users to search 
for, locate and retrieve articles—and much more—from a “vast 
domain of diverse texts” that span the Web. Further, just as Lexis 
users “may view, print, or download each of the articles yielded by 
the search,”107 the same is true for Google users. Although, 
infringement in Tasini was triggered by actual sales to the public, 
Ginsburg’s commentary has been cited for the broad proposition that 
merely making a work available on the Internet—where it is possible 
to retrieve and download the work—constitutes a distribution of that 
work.108 It is not clear from the opinion, however, whether the Court 
would require evidence of actual downloads. Ginsburg’s use of the 
term “retrieval” might suggest something more is required than 
merely making a work available. 
  
 
 103. N.Y. Times Co., 533 U.S. 483. 
 104. See id. at 487. 
 105. Id. at 498. 
 106. Id. at 503-04. 
 107. Id. at 490. 
 108. See Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d. at 637-38 (citing N.Y. Times 
Co., 533 U.S. at 488) (“[T]he Supreme Court held that two online database companies violated 
six freelance authors’ rights of distribution by making copies of their articles available to the 
databases’ users without the authors’ consent.”). 
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c. Early Decisions: Publication Occurred When 
Copies Were Made Available 
In 2002, the Southern District of New York addressed, for the 
first time, the publication of an entire webpage rather than a single 
music or image file embedded in one.109 In Getaped.com, Inc. v. 
Cangemi, the plaintiff developed the website Getaped.com to sell 
motorized scooters. Defendants copied the Getaped website and 
“post[ed] identical source code at their own sites.”110 Getaped sued 
claiming that replication of their website infringed its copyright.111 
The court granted Getaped statutory damages, holding that 
“when a webpage goes live on the Internet, it is distributed and 
‘published’ in the same way the music files in Napster or the 
photographs in the various Playboy decisions were distributed and 
‘published.’”112 In support, the court stated that “by accessing a 
webpage, an Internet user acquires the ability to make a copy of that 
webpage, a copy that is, in fact, indistinguishable in every part from 
the original.”113 Therefore, “[w]hen a website goes live, the creator 
loses the ability to control either duplication or further distribution of 
his or her work.”114 In reaching its conclusion, the court equated 
making files available on the Internet with loss of control of the 
possessory interest in tangible copies.115 The court held that this loss 
of control satisfied the transfer of ownership element of 
publication.116 
d. Publication—In Violation of the Distribution 
Right—Occurred When Copies Were Offered for 
Further Distribution 
In 2008, seven years after Napster, another peer-to-peer music 
file-sharing case, Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Anderson, was 
adjudicated.117 This time, however, instead of suing KaZaA, the 
network provider, Atlantic Recording Corporation sued an individual 
 
 109. Getaped.com, Inc. v. Cangemi, 188 F. Supp. 2d 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 110. Id. at 399-400. 
 111. See id. at 400. 
 112. Id. at 402. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (emphasis added). 
 115. See id. at 401. 
 116. See id. at 402. 
 117. Atl. Recording Corp. v. Anderson, No. H-06-3578, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53654 
(S.D. Tex. 2008). 
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user of the KaZaA network, Abner Anderson.118 Anderson admitted 
to “using the KaZaA online media distribution system to both 
download and make available, without Plaintiffs’ authorization or 
consent, certain Copyrighted Recordings.”119 In finding infringement, 
the court held that the terms “distribution” and “publication” were 
synonymous.120 
“Publication” includes “[t]he offering to distribute copies or 
phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further 
distribution . . . [and] making copyrighted works available for 
download via a peer-to-peer network contemplates “further 
distribution . . . .” and thus constitutes a violation of the copyright 
owner’s exclusive “distribution” right . . . .121 
Consistent with prior decisions, this court overlooked the § 106(3) 
requirement of transfer of ownership or in a possessory interest in 
reaching its conclusion. Although an offer to distribute may constitute 
a publication under § 101, it does not qualify as a distribution in 
violation of § 106(3).122 There must be at least a transfer of possession 
in the music file.123 
e. The Modern Trend: Violation of the Distribution 
Right on the Internet Requires Actual Distribution 
There are many parallels between London-Sire Records124 and 
Anderson.125 Both actions involved record companies suing individual 
users of peer-to-peer file-sharing networks.126 In each case, the issue 
was whether the users transferred a possessory interest in a sound 
recording—thereby affecting an unauthorized distribution.127 The 
decisions even came down in the same month, March 2008. 
Nonetheless, the London-Sire Records decision marked a significant 
shift in how courts view distributions on the Internet.128 Following 
 
 118. Id. at *1. 
 119. Id. at *6. 
 120. See id. at *18 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
552 (1985)) 
 121. Id. at *18-19. 
 122. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(3) (2011). 
 123. See supra text accompanying note 53. 
 124. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 125. See supra Part III.B.2.d. 
 126. See London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 157 (D. Mass. 2008); 
Atl. Recording Corp., No. H-06-3578, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53654 at *4. 
 127. See London-Sire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 166; Atl. Recording Corp., No. H-
06-3578, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53654 at *18. 
 128. See London-Sire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 153 (holding that (1) material 
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this case, the modern trend is to require more than making a work 
available for download; instead there must be an actual transfer of 
ownership to find a violation of the distribution right.129 This shift 
warrants a closer look at the approach taken by the court in London-
Sire Records. 
The alleged acts of infringement are now familiar. London-Sire 
sued individual users of peer-to-peer file-sharing networks who 
allegedly downloaded and distributed plaintiff’s sound recordings to 
the public.130 The defendants argued that to find infringement there 
must be “actual dissemination of copyrighted material.”131 
In deciding whether the statute required an actual distribution, 
the court turned to the statutory definition of “Publication”132: 
“Publication” is the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a 
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by 
rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies or 
phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further 
distribution, public performance, or public display, constitutes 
publication. A public performance or display of a work does not of 
itself constitute publication.133 
Looking to the first sentence, the court concluded that all distributions 
to the public are publications for purposes of Copyright.134 Separately, 
the second sentence explicitly creates an additional category of 
publications that are not distributions.135 “Plainly, ‘publication’ and 
‘distribution’ are not identical.”136 The court reasoned that not all 
 
objects include copies fixed in electronic form, and (2) distribution on the Internet requires 
actual transfer of ownership of a material object). 
 129. See Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008); London-
Sire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 153; Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976 
(D. Ariz. 2008). 
 130. See London-Sire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 159. However, unlike Anderson, 
the defendants here were known only by their computers’ IP addresses. See id. at 158-59. 
London-Sire served subpoenas on their internet service providers to establish defendants’ 
identities. See id. at 159. The court’s opinion was written in response to defendants’ motion to 
quash the subpoenas. See id. at 153. On a motion to quash, the court must consider—among 
other factors—whether the plaintiff asserted a claim upon which relief can be granted. See id. at 
164. 
 131. Id. at 165. 
 132. See id. at 169 (“[D]efendants cannot be liable for violating the plaintiffs’ distribution 
right unless a ‘distribution’ actually occurred.”). 
 133. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). 
 134. See London-Sire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 169. 
 135. See id. 
 136. Id. 
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publications involve distributions to the public.137 Thus, “Congress’ 
decision to use the . . . term [‘distribution’] when defining the 
copyright holder’s rights . . . must be given consequence.”138 
Therefore, in this context—where the alleged infringement is a 
distribution to the public—the court held that “defendants cannot be 
liable for violating the plaintiffs’ distribution right unless a 
‘distribution’ actually occurred.”139 
One month later, the court in Atlantic Recording Corp. v. 
Howell140 followed the holding in London-Sire Records. Howell was 
yet another peer-to-peer file sharing case. Following the analysis in 
London-Sire Records, the court reaffirmed that “a publication can be 
either a distribution or an offer to distribute for the purposes of further 
distribution, but that a distribution [to the public] must involve . . . 
[some] transfer of ownership . . . of a copy of the work.”141 Relying on 
earlier holdings, Atlantic Recording argued that Howell violated its 
distribution right in the sound recordings by making them available 
for the public to copy.142 Following London-Sire Records, the court 
rejected plaintiff’s argument. The court held that unless a “copy of the 
work change[d] hands . . . a ‘distribution’ under § 106(3) has not 
taken place.”143 
In September of 2008, the issue of what constitutes an electronic 
transfer of ownership arose in Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas,144 in 
which a jury found defendant Jammie Thomas guilty of infringement 
for “illegally downloading and distributing [Capitol Records’] 
recordings via the online peer-to-peer file sharing application known 
as Kazaa.”145 When Thomas moved for a new trial, the district court 
sua sponte challenged the jury instructions.146 Jury Instruction No. 15 
read: 
The act of making copyrighted sound recordings available for 
electronic distribution on a peer-to-peer network, without license 
 
 137. See id. 
 138. Id. at 169. See also 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (the exclusive right to “distribute copies or 
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by 
rental, lease, or lending”). 
 139. London-Sire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 169. 
 140. Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D. Ariz. 2008). 
 141. Id. at 985 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 142. See id. at 981. 
 143. Id. at 983  
 144. Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008). 
 145. See id. at 1212-13. 
 146. See id. at 1212. 
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from the copyright owners, violates the copyright owners’ 
exclusive right of distribution, regardless of whether actual 
distribution has been shown.147 
In its error analysis, the court diligently retraced the steps first taken 
in London-Sire Records.148 After reviewing the plain meaning of 
§ 106(3), and consulting a dictionary149 and Professor Nimmer,150 the 
court reiterated the reasoning found in London-Sire Records: 
“Liability for violation of the exclusive distribution right found in 
§ 106(3) requires actual dissemination.”151 As such, the court found 
Jury Instruction No. 15 to be erroneous and granted Thomas a new 
trial.152 Thus, Capitol Records reinforces the modern interpretation 
that unauthorized distribution requires transfer of ownership or 
possession of a material object. 
In summary, cases pertaining to Internet publication and 
distribution have begun to coalesce as to the meaning of these terms. 
Although an offer to distribute may constitute a publication under 
§ 101, it does not qualify as a distribution in violation of § 106(3).153 
Distribution requires transfer of possession.154 
3. Does Internet Publication Constitute Global 
Simultaneous Publication 
In October of 2009, Moberg v. 33T, LLC raised an issue of first 
impression with regard to foreign copyrighted works posted on the 
Internet155—whether publishing on the Internet constitutes global and 
simultaneous publication. 
 
 147. Id. at 1213 (emphasis added). 
 148. See id. at 1217-25. 
 149. See id. at 1217 (defining “‘distribute’ as, among other things, ‘1: to divide among 
several or many: APPORTION . . . 2 . . . b: to give out or deliver esp. to members of a group’” 
(quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 337 (10th ed. 1999))). 
 150. See id. at 1223 (“As Professor Nimmer has stated, ‘[i]infringement of [the distribution 
right] requires an actual dissemination of either copies or phonorecords.’ 2 Nimmer on 
Copyright 8.11[A], at 8-124.1.” (alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. 
Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 434 (8th Cir. 1993))). 
 151. Id. at 1226. 
 152. Id. at 1226-27. 
 153. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(3) (2011). See also Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. 
Supp. 2d 1210, 1218 (D. Minn. 2008) (stating that distribution on the Internet requires actual 
transfer of ownership); Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 985 (D. Ariz. 
2008) (same); London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 174 (D. Mass. 2008) 
(same). 
 154. See § 106(3). See also London-Sire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 174 (stating that 
distribution on the Internet requires actual transfer of ownership). 
 155. Moberg v. 33T LLC, 666 F. Supp. 2d 415 (D. Del. 2009). 
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In 2004, Plaintiff Håkan Moberg, Swedish resident and 
photographer, published a series of photographs on a German art 
website called blaugallery.com.156 In 2007, Moberg discovered 5 of 
his images had been posted on defendant 33T’s websites.157 Without 
first registering the photographs with the U.S. Copyright Office, 
Moberg filed his complaint alleging infringement based on 33T’s 
unauthorized distribution of his photographs on defendant’s 
websites.158 
33T moved to dismiss, arguing that because plaintiff’s 
photographs were posted on a website, and visible instantaneously all 
over the world, they were published not only in Germany, but also 
simultaneously in the United States.159 Therefore, 33T contended, the 
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s copyright 
claims because a “United States work” must be registered prior to the 
filing of a civil action for copyright infringement.160 
The court rejected 33T’s assertion, holding that Moberg’s 
photographs were not published simultaneously in the United States 
and Germany.161 As a matter of policy, the court opined: 
To hold otherwise would require an artist to survey all the 
copyright laws throughout the world, determine what requirements 
exist as preconditions to suits in those countries should one of its 
citizens infringe on the artist’s rights, and comply with those 
formalities, all prior to posting any copyrighted image on the 
Internet. The Berne Convention was formed, in part, to prevent 
exactly this result.162 
Therefore, the court held that plaintiff’s photographs were not 
“United States works,” and Moberg’s copyright infringement claims 
could stand without satisfying U.S. registration requirements.163 The 
Moberg court did not ignore the technical reality of simultaneous 
publication; instead it rejected its legal implication—that 
simultaneous publication qualifies works of foreign origin as United 
States works. Contrary to the plain language of the statute, the court 
reached this result in an attempt to comply with the absence of 
 
 156. See id. at 417-18. The series of photographs was of a woman and titled Urban 
Gregorian I-IX. See id. 
 157. See id. at 418. 
 158. See id. 
 159. See id. at 422. 
 160. See id. at 419; see also 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). 
 161. Id. at 424. 
 162. Id. at 422-23. 
 163. See id. at 424. 
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formalities principle of the Berne Convention. 
In 2011, a similar fact pattern emerged in Kernal Records Oy v. 
Mosley.164 In Kernal, the plaintiff record company alleged that 
Mosley made an unauthorized copy of the plaintiff’s sound recording 
of the song Acidjazzed Evening (AJE).165 The court addressed two 
issues: first, whether AJE had been published on the Internet in 
Australia, and second, whether AJE was simultaneously published in 
Australia and the United States, rendering it a United States work.166 
First, the court held that AJE was published on the Internet in 
Australia.167 In reaching this conclusion, however, the court applied 
the pre-2008 “making available” standard.168 “AJE was not merely 
transmitted over the Internet; it was downloadable and copyable 
which allowed the public to acquire a possessory interest in tangible 
copies of the work.”169 Applying the recent London-Sire Records,170 
Anderson,171 and Capitol Records172 approach the posting of AJE to 
the Internet would not qualify as a distribution. There must be actual 
downloading to show a transfer of ownership or of the possessory 
interest and thereby satisfy the statutory requirements for a 
distribution.173 
Second, having found AJE first published on the Internet in 
Australia, the court next considered whether the publication occurred 
simultaneously in the United States. There being no statutory 
definition of “simultaneous,” the court reached for a dictionary and 
confirmed the common meaning of “simultaneous” as “existing or 
occurring at the same time: exactly coincident.”174 The court opined 
“[t]here can be little dispute that posting material on the Internet 
 
 164. Kernal Records Oy v. Mosley, 794 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d, 694 F.3d 
1294 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 165. Id. at 1358. 
 166. See id. at 1360. 
 167. See id. at 1364. 
 168. See id. 
 169. Id. n.7. There is some doubt as to whether AJE had been posted to the Internet. 
Defendant’s testimony appears to indicate publication occurred on a disk magazine, rather than 
the Internet. Nevertheless, the court concludes that “the first publication of AJE was posted on 
an online magazine”. See id. at 1361. 
 170. See London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008). 
 171. See Atl. Recording Corp. v. Anderson, No. H-06-3578, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53654 
(S.D. Tex. 2008). 
 172. See Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008). 
 173. See London-Sire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 169. 
 174. Definition of Simultaneous, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/simultaneous (last visited Apr. 13, 2013). 
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makes it available at the same time—simultaneously—to anyone with 
access to the Internet.”175 Further, the court found no suggestion by 
Congress to exclude works published on the Internet from the 
definitions of “United States work” or “publication.”176 Based on the 
plain meaning of “United States work” and having already found AJE 
first published on the Internet in Australia, the court held that AJE 
simultaneously published in the United States.177 Therefore AJE was a 
“United States work” subject to the registration requirement.178 
Because Kernal had not registered its copyright before filing suit, 
the court granted summary judgment for defendants on the 
registration issue.179 Immediately thereafter, plaintiff obtained 
registration and moved to amend the complaint.180 Kernal Records 
argued that amendment was appropriate because it had relied on the 
position that AJE was not a “United States work” and therefore not 
subject to the registration requirement.181 However, the court denied 
Kernal Records’ motion for failure to show good cause for an 
untimely amendment.182 Kernal Records has filed an appeal with the 
Eleventh Circuit which affirmed the decision of the lower court.183 
IV. COMPLIANCE WITH BERNE CONVENTION 
A. U.S. Copyright Law Violates the Berne Convention 
The current definition of “United States works” in § 101 of the 
Copyright Act is overly broad. In particular, the use of the term 
“simultaneously” has proven to be problematic in the Internet age. 
Foreign works, when published on the Internet, are simultaneously 
published in the United States and world-wide.184 As a result of 
simultaneous publication in the United States, the foreign work is a 
“United States work” in accordance with the current definition: 
 
 175. Kernal Records Oy v. Mosley, 794 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d, 
694 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 176. See id. 
 177. See id. at 1368. 
 178. See id. 
 179. See id. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id. at 1369. 
 182. See id. at 1369-70 (“Plaintiff is attempting to amend the complaint to allege copyright 
registration when registration was not even sought until after summary judgment was granted 
for Defendants on the issue.”). 
 183. Kernal Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 184. See id. at 1368. 
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a work is a “United States work” only if— 
 (1) in the case of a published work, the work is first published— 
  . . . 
  (B) simultaneously in the United States and another treaty party 
or parties, whose law grants a term of copyright protection that is 
the same as or longer than the term provided in the United States; 
[or] 
  (C) simultaneously in the United States and a foreign nation that 
is not a treaty party . . . .185 
As a “United States work,” any work published by posting on the 
Internet is now subject to the registration requirement of § 411(a) and 
the copyright holder must register the work with the U.S. Copyright 
Office prior to filing a civil action in copyright infringement.186 As 
discussed above, the U.S. registration requirement of § 411(a) is an 
impermissible formality that violates the Berne Convention when 
applied to foreign works.187 
Congress never intended this result. U.S. copyright law was 
drafted before the emergence of today’s Internet. This is apparent 
from the 1988 BCIA hearings in which stated: “Indeed, countless 
authors, composers and artists—as well as small publishers—cannot 
with their limited means afford even to attempt ‘simultaneous 
publication’ of their works outside the United States.”188 Although the 
change from excluding “Berne Convention works” from registration 
to requiring registration only for “United States works” occurred as 
recently as October 28, 1998,189 this was still near the very beginning 
of the Internet explosion.190 For perspective, Napster would not be in 
existence for another nine months at the time Congress adopted the 
amendment.191 The ease with which works are now published, 
downloaded, copied, and distributed would have been unimaginable 
 
 185. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). 
 186. See § 411(a). 
 187. See supra text accompanying note 15. 
 188. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1987: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice, 100th Cong. 279 (1988). 
 189. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (specifying effective date of 1998 amendments as Oct. 28, 
1998). 
 190. Modern commercial use of the Internet did not manifest itself until the early 1990s. 
For example, Internet banking did not emerge until 1994 with the launch of First Virtual. In that 
same year, the first commercial banner ads appeared on www.hotwired.com. See Robert H. 
Zakon, Hobbes’ Internet Timeline 10.2, ZAKON.ORG, 
http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/ (last updated Dec. 30, 2011). 
 191. See GRALLA, supra note 67, at 11. 
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to the drafters of the current Copyright Act. 
The following examples illustrate: (1) how likely events similar 
to those in Moberg and Kernal Records are to recur, especially in 
light of the continued development of the Internet, and (2) the 
existence of a vast class of local copyright holders who, when 
publishing their work on the Internet, have no intention to publish in 
the United States nor would they benefit from such publishing. 
Imagine Sarah, a young woman with a passion for photography 
and an entrepreneurial spirit. Growing up in a small town in New 
Zealand, she decides to leverage her local connections and starts up a 
family photography business. Like many photographers today, she 
launches a website on which she posts pictures for her clients to select 
from and purchase. The site also serves as a marketing tool to 
promote her trade within the local community. As a family portrait 
photographer, the scope of her client base is limited to a geographical 
area in which she can reasonably commute to and from. 
In this example, it is clear that when Sarah publishes a series of 
family photos on her site, she is targeting that specific family and 
perhaps other locals who might now be inspired to schedule a photo 
shoot. However, under Kernal Records, her photographs are “United 
States works” and although Sarah doesn’t know it, the formality of 
the U.S. registration requirement now applies to her. If she needs to 
enforce her copyrights in the United States, she must first register 
under § 411(a). 
Building on the same example, Sarah begins posting and selling 
photographs depicting the natural scenery of New Zealand. A year 
later, she discovers that her images are on sale in the United States at 
a Wal-Mart store without her authorization. Once again, Sarah’s 
foreign works are deemed United States works and subject to the 
formality of registration in violation of Berne Convention. Although it 
is difficult to project the number of individual foreign copyright 
holders publishing their works on the Internet, it is reasonable to 
conclude that vast numbers of foreign works are presently subject to 
the formality of the U.S. registration requirement in violation of the 
Convention. 
The recent holding in Kernal Records shows the potential for 
harm.192 In addition to imposing the registration requirement—a 
formality in violation of Berne Convention—the court in Kernal 
Records granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment of 
 
 192. Kernal Records Oy v. Mosley, 794 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d, 694 F.3d 
1294 (11th Cir. 2012). 
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copyright infringement because plaintiff failed to register the 
copyright prior to filing the complaint.193 Kernal Records 
subsequently registered its copyright and filed an appeal.194 Congress 
never intended for parties like Kernal Records—who hold rights in a 
foreign work—to deal with the cost of litigating and losing a motion 
for summary judgment for failure to comply with a formality in 
violation of the Berne Convention.195 As the Article will demonstrate, 
the amendments need not be drastic to eliminate this issue. 
B. Possible Solutions 
1. Eliminate the § 411(a) Registration Requirement 
The elimination of § 411(a) certainly would eliminate the 
formality of the registration requirement and therefore would restore 
compliance with the Berne Convention. However, this is an overly 
drastic approach. As discussed above,196 Congress considered this 
very measure when drafting the BCIA but decided in favor of 
maintaining the requirement due to the following public benefits: (1) 
registration promotes efficient litigation practices, (2) registration 
may deter frivolous law suits, (3) registration helps to ensure a 
central, public record of copyright claims, and (4) registration is a 
source of acquisitions for the Library of Congress. 
2. Change the Definition of “Publication” 
A change to the definition of “Publication” must be made with 
extreme caution. There are well over 100 instances of the term 
“publication” scattered throughout the Copyright Act. As a result any 
solution implemented to restore compliance with Berne Convention is 
likely to trigger new and unexpected consequences. By contrast, the 
term “United States work” appears only once in the Act, and therefore 
it is less likely that an amendment here will cause unexpected 
consequences. 
3. Change the Definition of “United States Work” 
This Article recommends limiting the scope of “United States 
works” to include only those simultaneous Internet publications in 
which the copyright holder actively solicited customers in the United 
 
 193. See id. at 1368. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
 196. See supra Part III.A.1. 
DOMBKOWSKI  5/20/2013  12:16 PM 
672 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 29 
States. This proposal recognizes two classes affected by the 
simultaneous publication problem: (1) those who publish on the 
Internet with intent to actively solicit customers in the United States, 
and (2) those who publish on the Internet for any other purpose. 
“Active solicitors” who deliberately target their online resources 
at the United States for their commercial benefit essentially have 
elected to operate within the United States economy. As such, it is 
appropriate for the works in this category to be treated as “United 
States works” subject to the same formalities as those residing in the 
United States who publish on the Internet for the purpose of actively 
soliciting U.S. customers. 
In principle, this approach is consistent with the intent of the 
Convention’s “country of origin” framework. Article 5(4) was drafted 
so that the country of origin would coincide with the “locus of 
economic centre of the exploitation of their work.”197 If that rationale 
is applied in the Internet age, it is entirely consistent to assign the 
United States as the country of origin for those who simultaneously 
publish their works on the Internet for the purpose of “actively 
soliciting” customers in the United States, the U.S. being the 
economic center for the exploitation of their work. Therefore, if the 
United States is the country of origin for works that target U.S. 
customers, then U.S. domestic copyright law governs the work under 
Berne Convention.198 As such, the registration requirement would not 
be a prohibited formality in violation of the Convention. 
On the other hand, category 2 consists of individuals and local 
business owners like Sarah from the example above. These 
individuals should be free to publish on the Internet without concern 
for U.S. copyright formalities. 
The required amendments to § 101 are minor as the following 
proposed language demonstrates. Newly added language appears in 
italics. 
Proposed Amendments to 17 U.S.C. § 101 
For purposes of Section 411, a work is a “United States 
work” only if— 
(1) in the case of a work first published on the Internet, 
the copyright holder actively solicited customers in the 
United States; or 
 
 197. See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 3, § 6.64, at 288. 
 198. See Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(3). 
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(2) in the case of any other published work, the work is 
first published— 
(A) in the United States; 
(B) simultaneously in the United States and another 
treaty party or parties, whose law grants a term of 
copyright protection that is the same as or longer than 
the term provided in the United States; 
(C) simultaneously in the United States and a 
foreign nation that is not a treaty party; or 
(D) in a foreign nation that is not a treaty party, and 
all of the authors of the work are nationals, 
domiciliaries, or habitual residents of, or in the case of 
an audiovisual work legal entities with headquarters in, 
the United States. 
The newly amended clause only comes into effect where there has 
been a simultaneous Internet publication. Only then does the court 
consider whether the affected party is an active solicitor or not. To 
facilitate this determination this Article proposes a set of factors. The 
factors involve simple factual inquiries that can readily be made in 
support of summary judgment. 
Proposed Factors for Determining Active Solicitation: 
17 U.S.C. § 101 
Each factor relates to the website on which the work was first 
published. The factors weigh in favor of finding active solicitation 
directed at U.S. customers. In evaluating the factors, the court need 
only review the website and online advertising plan (if one existed) to 
make a determination. The factors include: 
(1) Targeting U.S. customers with online advertising units 
(i.e., banner ads);199 
(2) Targeting U.S. customers with USD pricing; 
(3) Enabling purchases in USD; 
(4) Providing customer support in English; 
 
 199. Online media units or banners ads can be targeted at U.S. customers to drive “click 
through” to websites anywhere in the world. See Geotargeting, DOUBLECLICK, 
http://support.google.com/richmedia/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=2584903 (last visited Apr. 
13, 2013) (“[T]he ad server uses IP addresses to determine geographic information about the 
user. With this data you can set up geotargeting . . . .”). 
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(5) Providing an English version of the website. 
The inquiry here is whether the web presence is designed to actively 
solicit customers in the United States. Where an affected party meets 
one or more of these criteria, the court may categorize the purpose of 
the publication as an active solicitation of U.S. customers. As such, it 
is appropriate under the proposed amendment to § 101 to treat the 
foreign work as a “United States work” subject to the registration 
requirement. All other works published on the Internet would no 
longer be subjected to the formality of registration. In achieving this 
result, U.S. copyright law would be restored to compliance with 
Berne Convention in the Internet age. 
V. CONCLUSION 
U.S. copyright law currently imposes formalities on works of 
foreign origin that are first published on the Internet, in violation of 
the Berne Convention. Congress never intended to impose the 
registration requirement on works of foreign origin. As such, it is time 
to amend the definition of “United States work” to properly deal with 
the new reality of simultaneous publication on the Internet. This 
Article recommends that works of foreign origin published on the 
Internet should be included in the definition of “United States works” 
only when the Internet publication actively solicits customers in the 
United States. All other simultaneous publications involving foreign 
works should be excluded. Implementation of this solution will 
eliminate the impermissible formality for the class protected by the 
Berne Convention while maintaining a level playing field with 
foreign competitors who avail themselves of the U.S. market. 
